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I. INTRODUCTION: IT’S THE LAW! (AT LEAST, ITS APPLICATION) 
Law — or rather the application of law — is the category of common 
law and civil law systems of civil procedure that is missing in the confer-
ence program.1 The previous session addressed “Getting Straight to the 
Facts”2 and “Getting Results”.3 Facts and results are fine, but what of 
law and its application? Should applying the law not have pride of place 
in systems of civil justice? Should it not be the measure of convergence? 
It is application of the law to the facts that determines what the results 
are. Until the consequences of applying law to facts are comparable, 
claimed convergence among legal systems is cosmetic.  
In announcing the conference program, Professor Chase asks “whether, 
in view of the ongoing procedural reforms, the age-old categories of  
                                                                                                             
*
 Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1
 International Association of Procedural Law (IAPL), Common Law – Civil Law: The Fu-
ture of Categories / Categories of the Future (2009 IAPL Annual Conference, Toronto, Canada: 
June 3-5, 2009).  See IAPL 2009, online: <http://www.iapl2009.org>. 
2
 Session III, “Changing Roles of Participants”, Part A: “Witnesses and Counsel: Getting 
Straight to the Facts”, id. (June 4, 2009) (emphasis added). For the papers prepared by the speakers 
during this session, see David Bamford, “The Continuing Revolution: Experts and Evidence in 
Common Law Litigation” (2010) 49 S.C.L.R. (2d) 161; Emmanuel Jeuland, “Changing Roles of 
Witnesses and Counsel in Civil Law Countries and, in Particular, in France (Le changement de rôle 
des témoins et des conseils dans quelques pays de droit civil et, en particulier, en France)” (in 
French) (2010) 49 S.C.L.R. (2d) 193; and Ian Binnie, “The Changing Role of the Expert Witness” 
(2010) 49 S.C.L.R. (2d) 179. 
3
 Session III, “Changing Roles of Participants”, Part B: “Judges and Parties: Getting Re-
sults”, id. (June 4, 2009) (emphasis added). For the papers prepared by the speakers during this 
session, see Judith Resnik, “Managerial Judges, Jeremy Bentham and the Privatization of Adjudica-
tion” (2010) 49 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205; Eduardo Oteiza, “Civil Procedure Reforms in Latin America: The 
Role of the Judge and the Parties in Seeking a Fair Solution” (2010) 49 S.C.L.R. (2d) 235; and 
Soraya Amrani-Mekki, “The Future of the Categories, the Categories of the Futur” (2010) 49 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 247. 
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common law and civil law, continue to be relevant … ”.4 I submit that 
categories of common law and civil law will continue to be relevant until 
common law systems apply law to facts routinely and not exceptionally, 
while doing so efficiently and not expensively. So long as common law 
systems make the separation of law and fact more important than bring-
ing them together, we shall not see convergence. 
I have stated my claim more broadly than I intend. While our pro-
gram speaks generally of common law and civil law, I restrict my claim 
to the two legal systems that I know first-hand: American common law 
and German civil law. My claim may also apply to other common law 
systems, such as those of English-speaking Canada and England, or to 
other civil law systems, such as those of Quebec and France, but I do not 
assert that it does.  
This paper consists of three further parts: Part II addresses the cen-
trality of the application of the law to civil procedure. It points out an 
infrequently recognized obstacle to correct and efficient application of 
law: the interdependency of determining the rules and finding the facts. 
Part III introduces the method that German civil procedure uses success-
fully in order to apply law to facts: the Relationstechnik (or “relationship 
technique”). It works. It is a method to strive for. Part IV concludes the 
paper by noting that American civil procedure lacks a method for dealing 
satisfactorily with the interdependency of determining rules and finding 
facts, and speculates whether such a method is possible. 
II. APPLYING LAW TO FACTS AND THE CONVERGENCE OF SYSTEMS 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Applying law to facts is fundamental to rational systems of civil pro-
cedure. Civil lawsuits resolve disputes between parties by determining 
the legal rights and the legal duties of the parties.5 If there were no civil 
                                                                                                             
4
 Letter from Oscar Chase to members of the American Society of Comparative Law, 
online: <http://www.comparativelaw.org/iapl09.pdf>.  
5
 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, “Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan’s Celes-
tial City” (1998) 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, at 1522-23 (“It is sometimes assumed that the business of 
courts is merely dispute resolution, by whatever means may be effective to bring repose. … I assume 
that this pre-Enlightenment purpose will not become the norm, and that we will continue to expect 
courts to decide cases by applying law to fact”); Oscar G. Chase, “Reflections on Civil Procedure 
Reform in the United States: What has been Learned? What has been Accomplished?” in Nicolò 
Trocker & Vicenzo Varano, eds., The Reforms of Civil Procedure in Comparative Perspective 
(Torino: G. Giappichelli, 2005) 163, at 165; Peter L. Murray & Rolf Stürner, German Civil Justice 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2004), at 575 [hereinafter “Murray & Stürner”] (the “primary 
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lawsuits, private parties might use self-help to realize their rights and to 
resolve their disputes. The stronger, rather than the righteous, would pre-
vail. To preserve peace and right, modern legal systems prohibit self-
help, except in limited cases. Instead, they seek the correct application of 
the law to the facts of each case.  
Primitive legal systems emphasized dispute resolution. Legal process 
— not substantive law — determined legal rights. As Professor Resnik 
has observed, this was a matter of rites instead of rights.6 Primitive sys-
tems accepted methods of dispute resolution, such as trial by ordeal or 
trial by battle, which were unrelated to parties’ rights. At least since the 
18th century Enlightenment, however, modern systems of civil procedure 
have rested on the idea that the outcomes of legal disputes should be de-
termined according to substantive law and not by the combative skills of 
the parties (or their representatives). 
1.  The Importance of Applying Law for Legal Systems 
Lawsuits take place within legal systems. The importance of legal 
procedures transcends individual cases.7 Most of the time, people apply 
the law to their own lives, outside of lawsuits. They can do this when the 
law fulfils a guidance function. People will follow the law because it ex-
presses their sense of justice and because they believe that the law will 
be enforced for all. This kind of self-application is essential to well-
functioning states. For every instance of the application of the law in a 
lawsuit, there are millions of instances of individuals applying the law to 
themselves in the absence of lawsuits.8 
When there is a generally accepted method of applying the law, and 
the rules are determinant and the facts are known, different people look-
ing at the same rules should reach the same conclusions. In such cases, 
people can conduct their lives within the rules, confident that they will 
                                                                                                             
purpose” of civil justice is “vindication of private rights”); Leo Rosenberg, Karl-Heinz Schwab & 
Peter Gottwald, Zivilprozeßrecht, 16th ed. (Munich: Beck, 2004); Manfred Wolf, Gerichtliches 
Verfahrensrecht (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1978), at 10 (“die Prüfung und Feststellung der 
materiellen Rechtslage”). 
6
 See Resnik, supra, note 3. 
7
 As Thomas W. Shelton, the “godfather” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, colour-
fully put it: “judicial procedure is to the substantive law what the arteries are to the human body; that 
the latter is worthless without the former”. Thomas W. Shelton, The Spirit of the Courts (Baltimore, 
MD.: J. Murphy Co., 1918), at 17. 
8
 See James R. Maxeiner, “Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: American Legal Meth-
ods and the Rule of Law” (2006) 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 517, at 523-24 [hereinafter “Maxeiner”]. 
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not be disturbed by assertions from the government or from third parties 
that their conduct is outside the law. They can rely on rules. If, however, 
application of the law is erratic and unpredictable — if application is 
divorced from the rules of law — people cannot safely rely on the law, 
even if the rules themselves appear determinant. 
Where it is the application of the law to the facts — and not a matter 
of procedure — that determines right, law will guide the process. Facts 
material to the law’s application are appropriate for the process; facts 
immaterial to law’s application have little place in the process. Legal 
process imposes on parties the power of the state to probe their lives. 
Unbounded legal process can place unacceptable burdens on the partici-
pants in the process. 
2.  The Process of Applying Law to Facts 
Applying law to facts requires determining and interpreting applica-
ble rules, finding material facts, and then applying these rules to the facts 
that have been found. It brings law and facts together. 
Each of these steps presents difficulties. Even in systems where the 
law is codified and well organized, determining the applicable rule is not 
simple. Even where the only law that one is concerned with is a code 
itself, specifying the applicable rule requires constructing a legal norm 
from the many provisions of the code; it requires sophistication and skill 
to identify which sections of the code are applicable to the current case, 
as well as talent in putting together the norm to be applied to the facts. 
That norm may then require interpretation. 
In a similar way, finding the facts is not necessarily a simple exercise 
either. Even in uncomplicated cases, evidence may be difficult to obtain 
or to evaluate. Documents may have disappeared; witnesses may be for-
getful. Even where cases are uncomplicated and evidence-taking is 
unproblematic, finding the facts in the context of a lawsuit can be chal-
lenging. The parties with knowledge are more interested in victory than 
in the correct finding of the facts. 
Once the law has been determined and the facts found, the deter-
mined law is applied to the found facts. That is ordinarily a syllogistic 
process: the legal rule is the major premise and the facts found are the 
minor premise. The facts are subsumed logically under the legal rule to 
reach the correct legal consequence. Each element of the major premise 
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of the norm must be fulfilled by a particular fact of the minor premise. If 
one fails, application of the norm fails. 
 Syllogistic law application enables self-application; it permits legal 
systems to respond to the need identified by H.L.A. Hart “for certain 
rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private 
individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up 
of social issues”.9 Although not without detractors, syllogistic law appli-
cation dominates daily practice in both the United States and Germany. 
No competing theory better describes what it means to apply rules to 
facts in ordinary cases.10 
3.  Back-and-forth in Applying Law: The Interdependency of Rules 
and Facts 
Applying a rule to the facts is considerably more challenging than is 
generally realized in the United States. Bringing rules and facts together 
depends on determining rules that are applicable to the facts and finding 
facts that are material to the applicable rules. No longer is it believed that 
the applicable rule can simply be read from statutes or precedents. In-
stead, it is necessary to search statutes and cases for rules, compare rules 
to facts, revisit statutes and cases in light of the facts found, and examine 
the facts again, in light of the rules. This process of going back and forth 
was identified in the first part of the 20th century, but, to this day, it is 
only occasionally noted.11  
                                                                                                             
9
 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), at 130. 
10
 Arthur Kaufmann, Das Verfahren der Rechtsgewinnung. Eine rationale Analyse: Deduk-
tion, Induktion, Abduktion, Analogie, Erkenntnis, Dezision, Macht (Munich: Beck, 1999), at 2-6,  
29-30, 54-62 (reviewing criticisms and discussing alternatives to deduction); Neil MacCormick, 
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), at 32-33, 43-47 (the legal syllogism is “central to legal reasoning”). For a discussion with 
further citations, see Maxeiner, supra, note 8. 
11
 See Jesse Franklin Brumbaugh, Legal Reasoning and Briefing: Logic Applied to the 
Preparation, Trial and Appeal of Cases, with Illustrative Briefs and Forms (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917), at 364-67; Thomas A. Mauet, Pretrial, 7th ed. (New York: Aspen 
Publishers, 2008), at 21 (“This process, going back and forth between investigating the facts and 
researching the law, is ongoing and is how you will develop your ‘theory of the case’”); Oskar 
Hartwieg & H.A. Hesse, Die Entscheidung im Zivilprozeß: Ein Studienbuch über Methode, Rechts-
gefühl und Routine in Gutachten und Urteil (Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 1981), at 78-79 (Die Lehre 
vom Pendelblick); Dieter Stauder & David Llewellyn, “Oskar Hartwieg’s Thoughts on the English 
Legal System” in D. Vaver & L. Bently, eds., Intellectual Property in the New Millennium: Essays 
in Honour of William R. Cornish (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 47, at 51; Herbert 
Schöpf, Die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Sachverhalt und Normenordnung bei der Rechtsanwendung 
(Diss. Erlangen under Reinhold Zippelius, 1971), Friedrich-Alexander Universität, Erlangen-
Nürnberg. 
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Determining the applicable rules and finding the material facts are 
therefore interdependent inquiries: until one knows which rules are ap-
plicable, one cannot know which facts are material. But until one 
knows the facts, one cannot know which rules are applicable. Settle the 
applicable rules too soon, and facts may be overlooked which would 
change the results if other rules were thus applied. Fail to settle the appli-
cable rules soon enough, and the process may detour to find facts that are 
not material under the rules that are actually applied.12 
The complexity of the task is exacerbated by the nature of the rules 
applied. Rarely does the determinative rule consist of just one syllogism. 
Usually, it consists of many syllogisms working together. Thus, going 
back and forth requires one to hold subsidiary rules in the ready, in case 
facts are found that call for their invocation. 
III. THE GERMAN RELATIONSHIP TECHNIQUE OF  
APPLYING LAW TO FACTS 
The German Federal Minister of Justice boldly asserts that “‘Made in 
Germany’ is not just a quality seal reserved for German cars or machin-
ery, it’s equally applicable to German law.”13 And what is it a quality seal 
for? She says that it guarantees “fair laws and an efficient judiciary”, 
“just solutions”, that “[e]veryone has access to law and justice, inde-
pendent of their financial means”, and courts that “decide without 
delay”.14 Even discounting for the tendency of lawyers to promote their 
own systems and solutions, this is a remarkable claim of success. She is 
not alone in her praise for the German system of civil procedure. It has 
won praise from international groups and it serves, not infrequently, as a 
model for other systems.15 
                                                                                                             
12
 Arthur T. von Mehren conceived of this problem in terms of concentration and surprise at 
trial. See Arthur T. von Mehren, “The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Con-
centrated Trial: Comparative Remarks”, in Norbert Horn, ed.  Europäisches Rechtsdenkens in 
Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrift für Helmut Coing zum 70. Geburtstag, vol. 2 (Munich: Beck, 
1982), at 361 et seq. [hereinafter “von Mehren”], relevant parts substantially reproduced in Arthur T. 
von Mehren & Peter L. Murray, Law in the United States, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) [hereinafter “von Mehren & Murray”]. 
13
 Brigitte Zypries, “Law – Made in Germany: global effektiv kostengünstig”, online: 
<www.lawmadeingermany.de>, at 3 [hereinafter “Zypries”].  
14
 Id. 
15
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 of the World Economic Forum ranks the 
German legal system among the top five systems in the category of “Efficiency of Legal Frame-
work”. It ranks the U.S. system 28th. Id., at 5. See generally Walther J. Habscheid, ed., Das deutsche 
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What are the quality controls of German justice? One is its method 
of applying law to facts, the Relationstechnik, or “relationship tech-
nique”. That technique is, in substance, what it was when it was first 
adopted as the approach to be used throughout the newly united Ger-
many in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877.16 A professional judiciary 
applies professionally drafted rules to facts using the “relationship tech-
nique” in order to produce professionally justified judgments. Thus, 
German procedure brings law and facts together through the “relation-
ship technique”. 
The foregoing syllogism is the basis of the “relationship technique”: 
the legal rule is the major premise, the facts are the minor premise and 
the judicial decision is the logical conclusion. The “relationship tech-
nique” is taught by the courts to all German jurists, whether they become 
judges or lawyers.17 It has been proven through more than a century of 
judicial practice. 
1.  The Major Premise: The Statute as Norm 
The statute is the fundamental concept of all German law. German 
statutes take the form of syllogistic norms. The major premise is that a 
legal consequence prescribed by statute applies when a generally de-
scribed state of facts is present. The minor premise is that a particular 
state of facts fulfils the statutorily prescribed state of facts.  
Moreover, while it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to plead the facts, it 
is up to the judge to know the law and to identify the applicable legal rule. 
In Germany, as in other civil law countries, the maxims jura novit curia 
(the court knows the law) and da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius (give me the 
facts, I will give you the law) apply. So long as there is any legal rule that 
would support relief on the facts alleged, the judge is to direct the service 
of the complaint. The plaintiff’s incorrect choice of rule is of no moment.  
The individual elements that are required by statute in order to  
establish a claim are the “spectacles” through which the judge views 
                                                                                                             
Zivilprozeßrecht und seine Ausstrahlung auf andere Rechtsordnungen (Bielefeld: Gieseking-Verlag, 
1991). 
16
 Compare Hermann Daubenspeck, Referat, Votum und Urtheil, 1st ed. (Berlin: F. Vahlen, 
1884), with its current version, Winfried Schuschke, Sattelmacher/Sirp, Bericht, Gutachten und 
Urteil, 34th ed. (Munich: Valhlen, 2008). 
17
 In an idealized form, students learn it early, in law school, as part of legal methods. A ba-
sic text on German legal methods has recently been translated into English. See Reinhold Zippelius, 
Introduction to German Legal Methods, 10th ed., trans. by K.W. Junker & P.M. Roy (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2008). 
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the case. What the judge can see through the spectacles matters; every-
thing else is immaterial.18 
Well-drafted statutes coordinate with each other well. Well-drafted 
statutes are clear about who may invoke them and what the consequences 
of their invocation are. Well-drafted statutes, to the extent possible, re-
quire that judges find objective facts rather than make subjective 
valuations. Well-drafted statutes do not expect judges to make political or 
other social policy decisions. While well-drafted statutes often require 
judges to evaluate individual equities and to find subjective facts (such as 
a party’s state of mind), they minimize, to what extent they can, the use 
of such determinations. When they cannot avoid such determinations, 
they guide the judge’s deliberations by setting boundaries and by giving 
examples.  
A well-drafted statute is no accident. Most modern legal systems 
have a central office that is responsible for the technical quality of stat-
utes. In Germany, preparation and perpetuation of good legislation is the 
raison d’être of the Federal Ministry of Justice. The Ministry engages 
some of the best-qualified jurists of the land in that work: former appel-
late judges. 
2.  The Minor Premise: Facts and the Process to Find Facts 
The relationship technique guides legal process without straitjacket-
ing it. The relationship technique avoids two extremes of civil procedure: 
a single-issue focus and a lack of focus altogether. It narrows the issues 
without cutting off the right to be heard. The “golden rule” of German 
civil justice is that there are no surprise decisions.19 Here, we discuss 
four of the ways in which the relationship technique guides process: (1) 
pleading; (2) deferred decision-making; (3) case-structuring; and (4) fo-
cused evidence-taking. 
(a) Pleading 
The plaintiff begins a lawsuit by filing a complaint with the court. 
Before the court serves the complaint on the defendant, it assigns the 
                                                                                                             
18 Joachim Hruschka, Die Konstitution des Rechtsfalles: Studien zum Verhältnis von 
Tatsachenfeststellung und Rechtsanwendung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1965), at 22-24. 
19
 Helmut Rüßmann, “Grundregeln der Relationstechnik”, online: <http://ruessmann.jura.uni-
sb.de/zpo2004/Vorlesung/relationstechnik.htm>.  
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case to a judge. This judge then makes a preliminary review of the com-
plaint for procedural prerequisites and other patent deficiencies. Already, 
even at this stage, the relationship technique anticipates the judgment 
that is to come. The plaintiff must plead a case that has a plausible 
chance of success. While the plaintiff need not plead the legal basis on 
which the complaint rests, the plaintiff must plead facts upon which re-
lief could be granted. Moreover, the plaintiff must plead the proof that 
the plaintiff intends to rely upon in order to prove the factual assertions 
(i.e., the plaintiff must “substantiate” the factual allegations of the com-
plaint). A properly substantiated complaint includes all of the material 
documents in the plaintiff’s possession, designates all of the material 
documents in the possession of other parties, and identifies the testimony 
on which the plaintiff plans to rely. It should state the facts so exactly 
that, based on the information provided, the court could potentially de-
termine that the claimed legal relief should be granted.  
If the judge should have concerns about whether or not the proce-
dural prerequisites have been met, or whether or not the complainant has 
sufficiently substantiated the factual allegations, then he or she is to di-
rect the plaintiff to clarify the point before dismissing the case.20 
Once the judge directs service and the defendant is served, the de-
fendant is required to answer the complaint. The defendant’s answer is 
subject to requirements similar to those that govern the complaint: its 
content must be true, complete, specific and substantiated. 
(b) Deferred Decision-making  
The German system masters the interdependency problem through 
the relationship technique. The relationship technique makes determina-
tions of applicable rules and findings of material facts concurrently, 
rather than consecutively. It finds facts “just in time”; it limits considera-
tion of facts to the material facts in the dispute. It routinely and 
efficiently applies law to facts in formal judgments. 
German judges defer the final decisions of individual aspects of 
cases until they are prepared to decide the case as a whole. German 
judges decide no issues before their time.21 The critical moment in a 
                                                                                                             
20
 See Michael Bohlander, “The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of German 
Civil Procedure in the Nineties” (1998) 13 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 25, at 33; Murray & Stürner, supra, 
note 5, at 210. 
21
 Paul Masson, advertising slogan: “Paul Masson [or “We”] will sell no wine before its time.” 
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German lawsuit is the last oral hearing when the court conclusively and 
finally applies the law to the facts that it has found. German parties do 
not have to commit, irrevocably early in the lawsuit, to a single legal 
claim or group of claims.  
While judges are authorized to reject evidence for being offered too 
late — and often do precisely that — their enthusiasm for such measures, 
which can serve to expedite the process, is tempered by their ever-
present duty of elucidation under section 139 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. This provision assures the right of parties to be heard, which is 
guaranteed by article 103 of the German Constitution. Section 139 is a 
far-reaching prescription, requiring judges to thoroughly discuss all as-
pects of a case with the parties involved. It rules out the possibility of 
one party surprising the other with an unexpected witness, fact or claim 
(a tactic known, colloquially, as “trial by ambush” in American law). 
Further, section 139(2) requires that the judge call to a party’s attention 
— and then give that party an opportunity to comment on — any non-
trivial issue that the party has apparently overlooked or considered insig-
nificant, or any point of fact or law upon which the judge’s 
understanding and the party’s understanding differ. 
(c) Case-Structuring  
Coincident with the preliminary review, the judge determines how 
the case is to proceed further — that is, whether the case will use addi-
tional written proceedings or a so-called early first hearing. The judge’s 
choice is purely pragmatic: the judge selects the method that he or she 
believes is the one that is likely to be more efficient, i.e., which method 
is more likely to simplify and hasten the framing of the material and dis-
pute issues. A party dissatisfied with this choice may request that the 
judge use the other method, in which case the party should state why the 
other method would be more efficient.  The judges with whom I have 
spoken have told me that most judges prefer early oral hearings in con-
tested cases. 
Prior to the first hearing or the exchange of further written pleadings 
(whichever the case may be), the judge is required to prepare for the fu-
ture proceedings. These preparations may include: (1) directing the 
parties to supplement their pleadings; (2) directing government authori-
ties to provide information and documents; (3) ordering the personal 
appearance of the parties; (4) summoning witnesses named by a party to 
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the hearing; and (5) ordering the production of documents or other mate-
rials, and making premises and other items available for observation. 
Sometimes, these preparations make it possible to resolve the entire case 
at the first hearing. 
At this stage, the judge structures the lawsuit without making any fi-
nal decisions on the case. The judge works with the parties to identify 
those issues that are both material to the plaintiff’s claims and in dispute. 
Such early structuring of the case, through issue framing, plays an impor-
tant role in keeping German civil justice proceedings within bounds. It 
identifies the legal rules that are under consideration for application, the 
elements of those rules, and the evidence that will be necessary in order 
to establish the elements of the rules. For each party, the judge points out 
any weaknesses in the party’s claim and then inquires how the party 
plans to revise it.  
Structuring the case and framing its issues serves not only to guide 
the judge in subsequent considerations, but also helps the parties to reach 
a settlement more expeditiously and reasonably. The parties can see 
which rules will determine the decision and which facts are needed. 
Some judges have informed me that they consider this structuring stage 
of the process to be one of their most important judicial duties. 
To an American accustomed to formal exchanges between the judge 
and counsel, the early first hearing to clarify issues is remarkable. By 
American standards, these hearings are interactive, cooperative and in-
formal.22 They resemble American pre-trial conferences more than 
American trials. They differ from American pre-trial conferences, how-
ever, in several important ways. What is most remarkable from an 
American perspective is the roles of the parties. Typically, the judge 
summons the parties themselves to the early first hearing and speaks di-
rectly with them. 
This kind of hearing is neither an American-style discovery nor an 
American-style trial.23 Its focus is on identifying the material issues of 
fact that are actually in dispute between the parties; it is not about uncov-
ering unknown facts or proving known ones, and it is not concerned with 
                                                                                                             
22 Murray and Stürner describe these hearings at length. See Murray & Stürner, supra, note 
5, at 256-59. 
23
 See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., “American Law Institute Study on Paths to a ‘Better 
Way’: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper” (1989) 1989:4 Duke L.J. 
824, at 854, n. 109 (incorrectly characterizing the hearing). 
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the possible presentation of a narration later.24 The judge probes the po-
tential claims and the facts that are needed to support them. In essence, 
the judge turns to the party and the party’s attorney, and asks: “now, on 
this issue, are you seriously going to dispute the fact?” 
What prevents the party or the party’s attorney from responding 
with: “so let the other side prove it”? Section 138 of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure imposes a duty of cooperation on the parties with respect 
to clarifying the issues in the case. Section 138(1) requires the parties to 
completely and truthfully give their declarations concerning factual cir-
cumstances; section 138(2) requires that they state their positions with 
respect to the facts asserted by the opponent. These discussions are not 
evidentiary. They do not constitute taking the testimonies of the parties. 
They amount to a clarification of the factual assertions of the parties that 
are necessary for the eventual application of the law to the facts. Section 
138(3) provides that an asserted fact will be treated as admitted if the 
other party is silent and fails to contest it. Section 138(4) provides that 
only in limited circumstances will a declaration of a lack of knowledge 
serve to put a matter into dispute. Moreover, section 138(2) is interpreted 
to require that a mere denial of a fact is not sufficient to put that fact into 
dispute. In most cases, a party must explicitly contest the fact that has 
been asserted. If the contended fact is known or could be known to the 
contending party, then that party must substantiate its contrary contention 
with the facts that are known to it. If one party, in the course of the hear-
ing or the pleadings, admits to a fact that has been asserted by the other 
party, then there is no need to prove that fact. In relatively short order, 
the judge can inform the parties of the applicable legal rules and then 
obtain their agreement on which matters of fact are material to those 
rules and are in dispute.  
(d) Focused Evidence-taking 
Thanks to case-structuring, many cases conclude without the oral 
testimony of witnesses ever being necessary. Where witness testimony is 
taken, framing the issues helps to focus and expedite the testimony. 
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 Cf. Frederick D. Wells, “A Justice Factory” in Justice Through Simplified Legal Proce-
dure (1917) 73 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 196, at 202: 
The court could practically say: “Now on this issue are you seriously going to dispute the 
fact? As a reasonable man, are you denying it?” If he answers “Perhaps it is so, but, let 
the other side prove it,” it ought to be possible for the court to throw his technical objec-
tions out of the window.  
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When it comes to taking the testimony of witnesses, German civil 
justice is just-in-time justice. The judge takes evidence only at the re-
quest of a party and only after the judge so orders.25 The judge is to order 
the taking of evidence only when it is necessary to convince him or her 
of either the truth or the untruth of a particular fact that is disputed by the 
parties and that is material to the decision of the case. Thus, the judge 
should not take evidence to prove undisputed facts, facts generally 
known to the judge, facts presumed by statute to be true until the con-
trary is proven, favourable facts established by the other party’s 
submissions, disputed material facts that have been established by undis-
puted facts, disputed facts for which the judge is already convinced of 
the truth without needing to take evidence and facts that are not neces-
sary for the judgment (e.g., when two alternatives for granting relief are 
allowed and one is already acknowledged).  
The judge’s control over the taking of evidence does not, however, 
prevent the parties from insisting on the taking of evidence that they be-
lieve is relevant to deciding material issues in the dispute. German judges 
have told me that a sure way to bring about a reversal on the appeal of a 
lower court judgment is through a judge’s rejection of an application to 
take evidence without strong justification. Such a refusal violates the 
judge’s section 139 duty of elucidation. 
3.  The Logical Conclusion and Its Validation: The Judgment 
While statutes guide the application of law, judgments validate the 
correct application thereof. They allow for the kind of “output” control 
that was discussed earlier at the conference. Judgments have four parts: 
(1) a caption that identifies the parties and the lawsuit (“Rubrum”); (2) a 
statement of the decision and of the relief ordered (“Tenor”); (3) a Tat-
bestand;26 and (4) the grounds for the decision (“Entscheidungsgründe”), 
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 John Langbein has written eloquently of this German advantage in civil procedure. See 
John Langbein, “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure” (1985) 52 U. Chicago L. Rev. 824. His 
main theme is that “by assigning judges rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans 
avoid the most troublesome aspects of our practice” (at 824). His article led to a flurry of discussion 
that has continued over the course of 20 years. A recent review can be found in Bradley Bryan, 
“Justice and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein’s Conception of Comparative Law and Proce-
dural Justice in Question” (2004) 11 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 521, at 523. 
26 Tatbestand is a legal term that has no single English translation. Depending on the con-
text in which it appears, a different English translation is appropriate. In this essay, Tatbestand refers 
to a specific part of a German judgment that is so designated. There is no formal counterpart to the 
Tatbestand in an American judgment. To avoid inducing a false understanding, it is left here in the 
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hereafter referred to as the “justification”. All four parts are subject to 
strict rules concerning style. The first two parts need no explanation; the 
last two do.  
The Tatbestand is a short statement that summarizes the parties’ legal 
claims and respective assertions of fact. It is not a finding of facts and, 
thus, it is not an analogue to the findings of fact in an American bench 
decision. The Tatbestand should include: the subject matter of the law-
suit; a sketch of the facts, but only in as much detail as is necessary to 
clearly establish the subject of the lawsuit; the evidence that has been 
offered by the parties; the applications of the parties; the relevant history 
of the lawsuit; and specific references to the file. It should not include: 
facts that are not necessary to the decision of the case; party statements 
that have been made previously in the proceedings, but are no longer 
relevant; the legal arguments of the parties; statements of the law; or 
normative evaluations of the facts. 
The justification applies the law to the facts. It determines the facts 
of the Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of the 
applicable rules. The process of applying the law to the facts is not a me-
chanical act of mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative 
evaluation. 
The justification follows a format that, in clarity and brevity, facili-
tates understanding. It begins by stating the result of the lawsuit and by 
identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or denies that the 
plaintiff’s claim is permissible under procedural law and well founded in 
substantive law. For example, a typical justification might begin: “the 
plaintiff’s action is, in all respects, permissible and well founded. Pursu-
ant to § 488, Paragraph 1, Sentence 2 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has 
a right arising from the loan agreement of December 12, 2007 to repay-
ment of the loan of 75,000.” 
The justification then systematically addresses the applicable rule, its 
elements, and, if the judgment denies the plaintiff’s claims, all of the 
rules that might support any of the claims. For each element of the rule, 
as far as it is necessary to do so, the justification clarifies the legal defini-
tion of the element as it relates to the particular case. Here, the 
justification may interpret the applicable statute, but only to the extent 
that it is directly relevant to a determination of whether the facts in the 
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criminal law, which might be translated as “elements of the offence”. 
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present case fulfil the elements of the statutory norm. Abstract discus-
sions of law have no place.  
The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It focuses on 
only those facts that are material to deciding the case. Immaterial facts 
have no place in the justification, except where they are necessary in or-
der to understand the court’s decision. The justification starts from the 
undisputed facts. Where facts are disputed, the justification evaluates the 
evidence that leads the court to decide as it does. The justification does 
not discuss the burden of proof, other than with respect to the material 
facts that are in dispute. 
Once the justification has clarified the material and disputed facts, it 
subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule. 
The judgment certifies that the procedure has fulfilled constitutional 
guarantees, which include the guarantees that every exercise of state 
power has been justified by and grounded in statute, and that the parties 
have each been heard and have received equal treatment under the law. 
The judgment is an act of an impartial and impersonal public authority 
that furnishes the official and objective interpretation and application of 
the law.27 It helps parties to understand why the court decided as it did. 
Ideally, it convinces the losing parties that the outcome is legally correct; 
at a minimum, it demonstrates that the process was rational. 
IV. CONCLUSION: COMMON LAW PROBLEMS AND CONVERGENCE 
If “‘Made in Germany’ is a seal of quality for German cars and Ger-
man law”,28 “made in America” might be a quality seal for American car 
companies and American civil procedure. American civil procedure 
works about as well as American car companies: sometimes it produces 
good results, but the overall venture needs help. 
In March 2009, a committee of the American College of Trial Law-
yers, a professional association of self-proclaimed elite trial lawyers, 
reported that the American civil justice system is “in serious need of re-
pair”.29 The objective of “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
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 See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture” in 
Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll, eds., Introduction to German Law 1, 2nd ed. (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2005), at 26-27. 
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 Zypries, supra, note 13, at 3.  
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 American College of Trial Lawyers, Final Report on the Joint Project of the American 
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of every action and proceeding … is … not being met”.30 American pro-
cedure takes too long, costs too much, discourages too many meritorious 
lawsuits, and encourages too many frivolous ones.31  
The cause of the problem, according to the elite trial lawyers, is that 
lawsuits do not routinely reach “early identification of the contested is-
sues to be litigated”.32 Lack of issue identification leads to a “lack of 
focus” in subsequent proceedings and to “nightmares” for the parties.33 
The solution to the problem, according to the elite trial lawyers, is 
that “[j]udges should have a more active role at the beginning of the case 
in … the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial.”34 The sys-
tem of notice pleading should be replaced by fact-based pleadings that 
would “define the issues of fact and law to be adjudicated”.35  
In other words, America’s elite trial lawyers recommend abandoning 
the “notice pleading” that was adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure of 1938. Evidently, they would replace it with something along 
the lines of the fact pleading that notice pleading had replaced. A recent 
decision of the United States Supreme Court, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,36 seems to go in a similar direction. 
1.  Common Law Problems in American Civil Procedure 
American systems of civil procedure aspire to facilitate application 
of the law. Their implementation of syllogistic application of legal 
norms, however, has been beset with persistent and recurrent problems. 
No satisfactory solution has been reached. Although alternatives to syllo-
gistic application of legal norms have been tried, they have not found 
general acceptance. 
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<http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%20Final%20Report%20Revised%204-15-
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 Id., at 3. 
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 Id., at 2:  
Although the civil justice system is not broken, it is in serious need of repair. In many ju-
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id., at 5. 
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 550 U.S. 544 (2007) [hereinafter “Twombly”]. 
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American difficulties in implementing syllogistic law application are 
attributable, in part, to failures to overcome the problem posed by the 
interdependent relationship between the tasks of determining the appli-
cable law and finding the relevant facts. As we have seen, German civil 
procedure addresses this problem by deferring the final choice of the law 
— and its application — until the very end of the process of finding the 
facts. This works because the process of finding the facts is directed by 
judges. In the United States, problems peculiar to common law methods 
(and, in particular, the historic form of the common law trial and the un-
systematic nature of common law rules) create impediments to such an 
approach that are not present in Germany. 
The historic common law trial was a concentrated presentation by 
the parties to the court, rather than episodic conferrals of the parties with 
the court. Preparation for an efficient trial required prior identification of 
the issues to be tried. It was a two-step process. First, the parties ascer-
tained the subject that must be decided upon; then, and only then, did 
parties present their cases to the court, in one continuous presentation 
that was without substantial interruption. The less clearly the issues for 
trial were identified beforehand, the more demanding, difficult and even 
dangerous (in the sense of risking the case) the preparation for trial 
would become. The parties had to prepare, not for the trial of one issue, 
but for the trial of all conceivable issues.37 
The court of the historic common law trial consisted of two decision-
makers: the judge and the jury. Each of these decision-makers had a 
separate responsibility. In order to permit the proper exercise of those 
responsibilities, the historic trial was thought to require a strict separation 
of the decision-makers’ respective roles.38 The classic division of the re-
ceived English model applied in America: judges determined issues of 
law, while juries found questions of fact.39  
This classic formulation — where judges determine the law, and ju-
ries find the facts — has, however, left unanswered the question of which 
decision-maker is to apply the rules that have been determined to the 
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 On the nature of the common law trial as a concentrated proceeding, see von Mehren, su-
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 The possibility that those responsibilities might be exercised jointly, rather than severally 
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facts that have been found.40 Historically, that question has been an-
swered variously, with considerable consequences for the application of 
law. The problem has proved intractable. 
The historic common law trial found substantive law in the forms of 
action. These rigid forms addressed only a few specific fact situations, 
the origins of which lay, even for the 19th century, in the distant past. 
The forms of action were not modern legal norms, and they had not been 
written to abstractly cover classes of cases that might not all be specifi-
cally described. These rigid forms were not created as a system, but as 
individual, particular solutions. As a consequence, the forms of action 
were not as a body seamless, but full of gaps. To fill in these gaps, com-
mon law courts resorted to legal fictions and tortured analogies. To 
provide justice where gaps remained, the chancellor created jurisdiction 
in equity. From this unsystematic lot of forms, however, parties — not 
judges — had to choose the law that would govern their cases. An incor-
rect choice meant dismissal; little in the system helped to guide the 
choice. 
American systems of civil procedure have taken common law prob-
lems as given, and have been structured accordingly. Whether they are 
based on common law pleading, fact pleading, or notice pleading, certain 
structural components of American systems of civil procedure all share 
the same approaches: 
(1) They provide for the application of law as a two-stage process. In the 
first stage, the subject of the decision is ascertained. In the second 
stage, the matter is decided. 
(2) They provide for decisions on the issues that have been presented by 
parties, rather than for the application of norms. Parties have princi-
pal responsibility for the selection of the law and the identification of 
the disputed issues of law or fact. Together, the parties frame the is-
sues to present to the court for its part: the decision-making. Courts 
only decide on the issues that the parties present. As a consequence, 
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 Charles Frederic Chamberlayne, A Treatise on the Modern Law of Evidence (Albany, 
NY: Matthew Bender & Co., 1911), §§ 68, 116, 119-120:  
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it is the parties more than the courts that are responsible for syllogis-
tic application of norms to cases.41 
(3) They are concerned with separating issues of law from questions of 
fact in order to permit judges to determine the former and juries to 
find the latter. 
(4) They apply unsystematic and uncertain law, which they allow law-
yers to expand. Lawyers educate courts in applicable law. They are 
licensed to argue for “extending, modifying, or reversing existing 
law or for establishing new law”.42 The civil law maxim jura novit 
curia (the court knows the law) does not apply. 
(5) As consequence of the foregoing, American systems, compared to 
the German system, place less importance on the results of applying 
the law to the facts, and more importance on the choice of the law 
applied, the allocation of decision-making and the presentation of the 
facts. 
2.  Can Common Law Problems Be Overcome? Can There Be Con-
vergence with Civil Law? 
We are unlikely to see convergence in the application of the law be-
tween German and American systems of civil procedure any time soon, 
unless substantial changes are made in American procedures. It is 
unlikely that the German system — which has proven successful — will 
change any time soon. It is more likely that the American system — 
which has undergone many unsuccessful reforms — might make yet fur-
ther reforms. Americans have put up with three generations of failure of 
notice pleading and discovery; there are signs that they might not tolerate 
another.43  
A restoration of fact pleading, such as that proposed by the American 
College of Trial Lawyers and hinted at by the United States Supreme 
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Court in the Twombly case,44 would not fix what ails the American sys-
tem. It would reprise two centuries of failure to solve the problem of the 
interdependency between the determination of applicable law and the 
finding of relevant facts.45 Learning from foreign experiences is, for the 
American legal system, no longer merely desirable — it is imperative. 
Two measures that could help to fix the American system and move 
it in the direction of convergence with German civil justice are: 
(1) concurrent, instead of sequential, determinations of the rules, the 
findings of fact, and the application of the rules to the facts; 
(2) judicial application of norms that have been selected by the judge, 
rather than determinations by the court of the issues that have been 
presented by the parties. 
An objection that may be raised is that both of these measures are 
impossible. The jury trial and, above all, the concentration of proceed-
ings that the jury trial seems to demand, preclude them. 
Such an objection denies the imaginative forces behind American 
civil justice and the capability of American systems to try new ap-
proaches. American proceedings today are very different from what they 
were in 1937, the year before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came 
into force, or in 1847, the year before the Field Code of Civil Procedure 
took effect.  
There are possibilities that place judges in charge of applying the law 
to specific facts that they have relied upon the juries to find (e.g., special 
verdicts and jury interrogatories). For the immediate future, we can see 
possibilities for summoning a jury together, remotely and intermittently, 
using the Internet. 
Americans would do well to conceptualize civil procedure inclu-
sively — that is, as a whole — including the pre-trial and trial stages. 
German procedure has no trial; it has proceedings that, from the first, 
are oriented toward an application of the law to the facts. German pro-
cedure is concerned with determining legal rights and deciding disputes. 
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It is what American procedure should be, in Clark’s words: the “hand-
maid of justice”.46  
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